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NOTE
"High Comedy but Inferior Justice"': The Aftermath of Grady v. Corbin
I. INTRODUCTION
The rule of law espoused in the United States Supreme Court decision of
Grady v. Corbin2 serves to expand a defendant's protection against double
jeopardy. However, the apparent intent of the opinion is to allow a defend-
ant the protection of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. The
apparent effect of the opinion is to allow a defendant to escape punishment
for crimes which do not appear to violate the defendant's double jeopardy
rights. The question presented is: Under what circumstances do subse-
quent prosecutions for crimes committed in a single episode or transaction
violate a defendant's protection against double jeopardy? This analysis will
focus on what constitutes the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. It will demonstrate the far-reaching effects of Grady and the impact
it has had on prosecutors' offices across the country.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his automobile across the
double line of a New York highway striking two oncoming vehicles.
3
Corbin received two uniform traffic tickets that evening: One for driving
while intoxicated, the other for failing to keep right of the median.' Assis-
tant District Attorney Thomas Dolan learned that the driver of one of the
two other vehicles, Brenda Dirago, died as a result of the collision and that
her passenger, Daniel Dirago, survived but sustained serious injuries.5
Three days later a second Assistant District Attorney, Frank Chase,
began gathering evidence for a homicide prosecution against Corbin, in ad-
dition to preparing assault charges for the injuries to the passenger. 6 Ac-
cording to the lower court:
1. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2104 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
3. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990).
4. Id at- , 110 S. Ct. at 2088. Corbin took a blood test at the hospital which indicated he
had a blood alcohol level of 0.19%, nearly twice the legal limit. Id
5. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
6. Id
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Despite his active involvement in building a homicide case against
[Corbin], however, Chase did not attempt to ascertain the date
[Corbin] was scheduled to appear... on the traffic tickets, nor did
he inform, either the Town Justice Court or the Assistant District
Attorney covering that court about his pending investigation.7
As a result, when Corbin pleaded guilty to the two misdemeanor traffic
tickets on October 27, 1987, the presiding judge was unaware of the fatality
that stemmed from the accident' and accepted Corbin's guilty plea to the
misdemeanor charges.9
Two months later, a grand jury indicted Corbin on various homicide
and assault charges which arose from the October 3, 1987 incident. 0 The
prosecution identified the three reckless or negligent acts upon which it
would rely to prove the homicide and assault charges as follows: "(1) oper-
ating a motor vehicle on a public highway in an intoxicated condition, (2)
failing to keep right of the median, and (3) driving approximately 45 to 50
miles per hour in heavy rain, 'which was a speed too fast for the weather
and road conditions then pending.' , Two of the three acts outlined by
the prosecution encompassed the same conduct as the traffic citations for
which Corbin had previously been convicted. Corbin moved to dismiss the
indictment on statutory and constitutional double jeopardy grounds.1 2 Af-
7. Corbin v. Hillery, 543 N.E.2d 714, 716 (N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). As a result, Assistant District Attorney Mark Glick, who
prepared the statement of readiness for the Town Justice Court, did not mention Brenda Dirago's
death in that statement. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
8. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2088. No member of the District Attorney's office
was present in court when Corbin pleaded guilty to the traffic tickets. Id. The court did not ask
Corbin if any others had been injured on the night in question and Corbin chose not to incrimi-
nate himself by volunteering such information. Id. The New York Court of Appeals held that
"although an attorney may not misrepresent facts, 'a practitioner representing a client at a traffic
violation prosecution should not be expected to volunteer information that is likely to be highly
damaging to his client's position.'" Id. n.4 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court accepted the
court of appeals ruling on that issue. In so doing, the Court did not decide whether its double
jeopardy analysis would be any different in the situation where affirmative misrepresentations of
fact by a defendant or his counsel were to mislead a court into accepting a guilty plea it would not
otherwise accept. Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
9. Id. At a subsequent sentencing proceeding, yet another Assistant District Attorney, Heidi
Sauter, was unaware of the fatality which resulted from the accident and was unable to locate the
case file. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2089. Nevertheless, she recommended that Corbin receive the
minimum sentence. The court sentenced Corbin to a $350 fine, a $10 surcharge, and a six month
license revocation. Id.
10. Id. The date of the indictment was January 19, 1988. It charged Corbin with reckless
manslaughter, second degree vehicular manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide for caus-
ing the death of Brenda Dirago. Id. It further charged him with third degree reckless assault for
causing physical injury to Daniel Dirago, as well as driving while intoxicated. Id.
11. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2089.
12. Id.
GRADY v. CORBIN
ter a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.1" Corbin then sought a writ
of prohibition to bar prosecution of all counts in the indictment.1 4 The
appellate division denied the petition but the New York Court of Appeals
reversed. 15
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of Ap-
peals ruling in a five to four decision. 6 Justice Brennan, writing the major-
ity opinion for the sharply divided Court,1 7 held that a prosecution on the
indictment constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.1
8
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."' 9 The constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy consists
of three separate guarantees: "It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense."2 "It has long been understood that separate
statutory crimes need not be identical-either in constituent elements or in
actual proof-in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitu-
tional prohibition."'" For years, courts have searched for the meaning of
the "same offense" language of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated a stan-
dard which determined when two prosecutions were for the same offense
and, therefore, barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.22 In Blockburger,
13. Id. The Dutchess County Court ruled that Corbin's and/or his attorney's failure to in-
form the Town Justice Court at the time of the guilty plea that the incident involved a fatality
constituted a "'material misrepresentation of fact' that 'was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.'" Id; see supra note 8. However, the New York Court of Appeals did not find that any
misrepresentations or misconduct had occurred during the guilty plea proceedings. Grady, 495
U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2089 n.6. The Supreme Court accepted that characterization of the
proceedings. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2089.
15. Id.
16. Id at 2087.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The
Double Jeopardy Clause originally embodied the common law plea of "former jeopardy." See
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-41 (1975).
20. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citations omitted).
21. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977).
22. 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932). In 1889, the Supreme Court initially considered whether two
criminal statutes define the same offense. George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive
1991]
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the jury found the defendant guilty of three counts of violating the Harrison
Narcotic Act.23 The first conviction was for the sale of a controlled sub-
stance not in or from the original stamped package, as required by the stat-
ute.24 The second conviction was for a separate sale of the same drug the
following day to the same purchaser.25 The third conviction was for selling
the drug "not in pursuance of a written order by the purchaser" as the
statute required.26 The defendant appealed his convictions on double jeop-
ardy grounds arguing that the two sales made to the same purchaser consti-
tuted a single, continuing offense.27
The Court rejected Blockburger's contention on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds. The Court concluded that the Narcotic Act did not create
the offense of engaging in the business of selling the prohibited and forbid-
den drugs.28 Rather, the Act penalized any sale that violated the Act.29
Consequently, "[e]ach of several successive sales constitute[d] a distinct of-
fense, however closely they ... follow[ed] each other.' ' 3' The Court found
that the first sale had been completed and therefore was distinct from the
second sale made the following day.31
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. R~v. 323, 343 (1986).
In the case of In re Nielsen, the Court held that a conviction of a greater crime was a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for a lesser one. 131 U.S. 176 (1889). The Nielsen Court concluded that a
conviction for cohabitation (a greater crime) barred a subsequent prosecution for adultery (a lesser
included crime). Id. at 186. However, the Court did not articulate a standard by which to evalu-
ate when a crime is the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Legal scholars believe that the
Nielsen Court used a "necessary element" test which precludes a second trial "if the prosecution
must rely on conduct already used to prove another offense." Thomas, supra at 339.
It has been suggested that double jeopardy considerations vary depending on whether the
defendant's first trial ended in a conviction, autrefois convict, or an acquittal, autrefois acquit. The
Nielsen Court wrote: "Whether an acquittal would have had the same effect to bar the second
indictment is a different question, on which we express no opinion." Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 187.
However, "[b]oth the history of and the values protected by the double jeopardy clause.., suggest
that the result of the first trial should make no difference in deciding whether a second trial is for
the same offense." Thomas, supra at 339.





28. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
29. In particular, a violation of the Narcotic Act constitutes any sale of a controlled sub-
stance, defined as one not made in or from the original stamped package, or not made in pursu-
ance of a written order by the purchaser. Id. at 300 nn.l-2.
30. Id. The Court relied on the distinction found in WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (11th
ed. 1912) which states: "when the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long
the action may continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in
swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
31. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303.
GRADY v. CORBIN
In its constitutional analysis, the Court articulated a rule to determine
whether the two sales were the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not .... "A single act may be an offense against two
statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punish-
ment under the other." 32
In applying this "additional element" test, the Court held that while the
second sale violated the same two sections of the Act that the first sale did,
each section required proof of an additional fact which the other did not.
Thus, because the defendant had committed two distinct crimes after he
had made the second sale, the defendant's double jeopardy claim was with-
out merit.33
The Supreme Court applied the Blockburger test in the case of Brown v.
Ohio.34 In Brown, the defendant pleaded guilty to joyriding.3" Upon the
completion of his sentence for that offense,3 6 the State indicted Brown for
theft of the car in which he had been caught joyriding. 37 Brown pleaded
guilty to that offense, with the understanding that the trial court would
consider his claim of double jeopardy on a motion to withdraw his plea.38
However, the trial court overruled Brown's double jeopardy objection.
In the majority opinion, Justice Powell quoted the Blockburger test and
described it as the "established test for determining whether two offenses
are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative pun-
32. Id at 304 (citations omitted). If one statute does not require any additional elements to
prove a particular offense, that offense is said to be a "lesser included offense." A prosecution of a
defendant for both the greater offense and the lesser included offense is unconstitutional because
they are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977).
33. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303-04.
34. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
35. Id. at 162. The governing Ohio statute on "joyriding" stated that: "No person shall
purposely take, operate, or keep any motor vehicle without the consent of its owner." Id. n.1.
36. The court sentenced Brown to thirty days in jail and a $100 fine. Id at 162.
37. Brown, 432 U.S. at 162-63. The governing Ohio statute on auto theft read that: "No
person shall steal any motor vehicle." Id at 163. Brown stole the auto from a parking lot in East
Cleveland, Ohio, on November 29, 1973. Police apprehended him in Wickliffe, Ohio, on Decem-
ber 8, 1973. Id at 162.
38. Id at 163.
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ishment."3 9 In applying the Blockburger test, the Court ruled that joyrid-
ing and auto theft constituted " 'the same statutory offense' within the
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause."'  Thus, when Brown pleaded
guilty to the lesser included offense of joyriding, and then subsequently
pleaded guilty to the greater offense of auto theft, he was placed in double
jeopardy.41
Two weeks after the Brown decision, the Court decided Harris v.
Oklahoma.42 During a robbery, Harris' companion shot and killed a gro-
cery clerk.43 A jury convicted Harris of felony murder. The State then
indicted and convicted him for robbery with a firearm.' "The two prosecu-
tions were not for the 'same offense' under Blockburger since, as a statutory
matter, felony murder could be established by proof of any felony, not just
robbery, and robbery with a firearm did not require proof of a death."45
However, the State conceded that the robbery was the underlying felony, all
elements of which had already been proved in the felony murder prosecu-
tion.46 Therefore, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
the prosecution for the robbery because it was a species of the lesser in-
cluded offense of felony murder.47
Three years after Harris, the Supreme Court heard a case strikingly sim-
ilar in fact to Grady. In Illinois v. Vitale, an auto driven by the defendant
struck and killed two small children.4" At the scene of the accident, a po-
39. Id. at 166.
40. Id. at 168.
41. Id. at 169-70; see supra text accompanying note 32. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun
argued that Brown was guilty of two distinct crimes: one on November 29, 1973, when he stole
the car and one on December 8, 1973, when he took the auto for a joyride. Brown, 432 U.S. at
171-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that Brown certainly stopped driving
the car sometime within the nine days. "When he operated it again ... the Ohio courts could
properly find, consistently with the Double Jeopardy Clause, that the acts were sufficiently distinct
to justify a second prosecution." Id. at 171.
42. 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
43. Id. at 682.
44. Id.
45. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2092 (1990) (discussing Harris v.
Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)).
46. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980) (discussing Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682
(1977)).
47. Id. at 420-2 1; see supra note 32 and accompanying text. In his concurrence, Justice Bren-
nan foreshadowed the rule of law expounded in Grady. Brennan stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "requires" the prosecution
in one proceeding, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of 'all the charges
against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.'"
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 683 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Ashe v. Swen-
son, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)).
48. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 411-13.
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lice officer issued Vitale a citation for failing to reduce speed to avoid an
accident.49 After a bench trial, the court convicted the defendant for this
offense." The following day, the State charged Vitale with two counts of
involuntary manslaughter.5 " Vitale argued that failure to reduce speed was
a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.52 The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that as long as the State relied on evidence other
than that used to prove the failure to reduce speed the Double Jeopardy
Clause would not bar a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.5 3
Dowling v. United States5" preceded Grady by approximately four
months. It suggests that the rule of law expounded in Grady is fact inten-
sive. In Dowling, a jury acquitted the defendant of burglary, attempted rob-
bery, assault, and weapons offenses.55 Vena Henry, who was the victim in
that case, testified on the government's behalf against Dowling. 6 Ms.
Henry also testified on the government's behalf against Dowling in a subse-
quent trial for an unrelated bank robbery. The government used her testi-
mony for the limited purpose of establishing Dowling's identity as the
robber.5 The jury found Dowling guilty of the bank robbery.
49. Id. at 411.
50. L. at 412. The court sentenced Vitale to a $15 fine. The maximum punishment in Illi-
nois for failing to reduce speed was thirty days in jail or a $500 fine. Id n.3.
51. Id at 412-13.
52. rd The Illinois Supreme Court held that "'the lesser offense [of] failing to reduce speed,
requires no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction of the greater, involuntary man-
slaughter.. . ."' Id at 414 (quoting In re Vitale, 375 N.E.2d 87, 91 (IlL. 1978)). The court
concluded further that "for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, the greater offense is by defini-
tion the 'same' as the lesser offense included within it." Id Thus, the manslaughter prosecution
was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
53. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420. The Supreme Court held that:
[Ilf manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the
two offenses are not the 'same' under the Blockburger test. The mere possibility that the
State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients necessarily included in the traffic offense to
establish an element of its manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter
prosecution.
Id at 419 (emphasis added). The Court appeared to focus on the evidence used to prove the
conduct rather than on the conduct itself.
The Vitale Court suggested that if the prosecution sought to establish an essential element of
the manslaughter charge by proving all the elements of the conviction for failure to slow, the
defendant would have a substantial double jeopardy claim. Id. at 421. After Grady, the dictum of
Vitale is now the law of the land. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
54. 493 U.S. 342 (1990). The Court decided Dowling on January 10, 1990. The Court de-
cided Grady on May 29, 1990. 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
55. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 345.
56. Id at 344.
57. Id at 345. The government also used Ms. Henry's testimony to establish a link between
Dowling and another person involved in both robberies, Delroy Christian. Id. The government
relied on FED. R. EVID. 404(b) which provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may
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Dowling appealed on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that his prior
acquittal precluded the government from introducing Ms. Henry's testi-
mony.58 Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that the common
law doctrine of collateral estoppel 9 does not, in all circumstances, bar the
later use of evidence relating to prior conduct for which the defendant has
been previously acquitted." In affirming Dowling's conviction, the Court
concluded that the evidence was admissible because Dowling failed to
demonstrate that his acquittal in the first trial represented a jury determina-
tion that he was not one of the men who entered Ms. Henry's home.6
be admissible against a defendant for purposes other than character evidence. Id (The corre-
sponding rule in Wisconsin is found at Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1989-90)). Rule 404(b) deems
such evidence admissible in order to establish "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." During the trial for the bank robbery,
the district court properly instructed the jury to use Ms. Henry's testimony for the limited pur-
pose of establishing the defendant's identity as the robber. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 345- 46.
58. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 347.
59. One aspect of the protection against double jeopardy is the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). The principle of collateral estoppel
developed in civil litigation. However, it has been an established rule of federal criminal law for
almost seventy-five years. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). Defendants
most commonly invoke collateral estoppel "to foreclose an issue resolved by an earlier acquittal
and thus to bar prosecution entirely." See Ann Bowen Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal
Cases: Reuse of Evidence After Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1989).
In its continuing search for a meaning of the "same offense," the Supreme Court held that
collateral estoppel was embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, and,
therefore, an acquittal precluded a state from bringing a defendant to trial again on that same
charge. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46.
60. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350. The Court distinguished Dowling from Ashe on its facts. Id at
347. In Ashe, three or four masked gunmen, one of whom was Ashe, robbed six participants in a
poker game. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 437. At Ashe's first trial, the evidence clearly established that the
named victim, Knight, had been one of the victims of the armed robbery. Id. at 438. The Court
noted that the proof of that fact was "unassailable." Id. However, the evidence used to identify
Ashe as one of the gunmen was weak. The jury found the defendant "'not guilty due to insuffi-
cient evidence.'" Id. at 439.
Six weeks later, the State prosecuted Ashe for the robbery of a second poker player. Id. The
trial court overruled Ashe's motion to dismiss which he based on his previous acquittal. Id. The
witnesses at the second trial were generally the same. Nevertheless, the witnesses' testimony
which identified Ashe as one of the gunmen was "substantially stronger." Id. at 439-40. The jury
found Ashe guilty at the second trial. Id.
The Supreme Court held that Ashe's conviction was improper, because the issue of the defend-
ant's identity had been determined at the first trial. "The single rationally conceivable issue in
dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by
its verdict found that he had not." Id. at 445. Therefore, based on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, the Court reversed Ashe's conviction.
61. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350. The trial judge, who had also presided at Dowling's first trial,
recalled that Dowling "was not acquitted on the issue of identification." Id. at 351. The Court
19911 GRADY v. CORBIN
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
The rule of law articulated in Grady v. Corbin 62 is a dramatic expan-
sion of the Blockburger test. The opinion, authored by Justice Brennan,
appears to be a culmination of his attempts over the years to modify the
Blockburger test.63 Grady redefined the parameters of a defendant's rights
under the Double Jeopardy Clause indicating that the Blockburger test is an
insufficient mechanism by which to resolve double jeopardy disputes. In
fact, "[t]he Blockburger test is simply a 'rule of statutory construction,' a
guide to determining whether the legislature intended multiple punish-
ments."'  Recognizing that the Blockburger test had developed "in the
context of multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution,"6 the
Court concluded that the Blockburger test required modifications in the
event of successive prosecutions. 66
The Court expressed concern for protecting individuals against the
threat of successive prosecutions. The Court stated that "the State...
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
... thereby... compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity."'67 Another apparent reason for this protection is that
acknowledged that "[tlhere are any number of possible explanations for the jury's acquittal ver-
dict at Dowling's first trial." Id. at 352.
It is significant to note that the defendant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the first
jury verdict determined an ultimate issue of consequence in the subsequent trial. Id. at 350.
Notwithstanding, it appears to be within the court's discretion to decide whether the prior jury
verdict did, in fact, determine the disputed fact. For example, the Court in Ashe speculated that
the jury could only have returned an acquittal because the state failed to prove the defendant's
identity as the perpetrator. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445. However, the Dowling Court was unwilling to
make such an assumption. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352. The Dowling majority properly refused to
assume the role of the jury.
62. 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
63. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 427 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 171 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366 (1983)).
65. Grady, 495 U.S. at- , 110 S. Ct. at 2090-91 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.
773, 778 (1985), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 927 (1985)). In that context, "the Double Jeopardy Clause
does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishments than the
legislature intended." Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting Hunter, 495 U.S. at
366).
66. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2091. A technical comparison of the elements of
the two offenses required by the Blockburger test does not protect defendants sufficiently from the
burden of multiple trials. Id at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2086. The Court explicitly stated that Grady
applies regardless of whether the first trial ended in an acquittal or a conviction. See also supra
note 22.
67. Grady, 495 U.S. at--, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187 (1957)).
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"[m]ultiple prosecutions also give the State an opportunity to rehearse its
presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction
"68
Consequently, the majority held that a strict application of the Block-
burger test was not the exclusive means of determining whether a subse-
quent prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.69 The Court
reiterated that "the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
hibits successive prosecutions for the same criminal act or transaction
under two criminal statutes whenever each statute does not 'requir[e] proof
of a fact which the other does not.' ",0 Thereupon, the Court adopted the
dicta set forth in Illinois v. Vitale, to be the supreme law of the land. The
Court held that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prose-
cution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an of-
fense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted."7 1 In at-
tempting to reconcile its holding with Dowling v. United States, the Court
indicated that Grady was not an "actual evidence" or "same evidence"
test.72 Rather, the critical inquiry is what conduct the State will prove, not
the evidence used to prove that conduct. 3 The Court stated: "The presen-
tation of specific evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the govern-
ment from introducing that same evidence in a subsequent proceeding."'74
68. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2091-92. The Grady Court further elaborated:
The State could improve its presentation of proof with each trial, assessing which witnesses
gave the most persuasive testimony, which documents had the greatest impact, which
opening and closing arguments most persuaded the jurors. Corbin would be forced either
to contest each of these trials or to plead guilty to avoid the harassment and expense.
Id at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2093; see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (the state conceded
that after the defendant's first trial, the prosecutor at the subsequent trial did "what every good
attorney would do-he refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial.").
69. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2092; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67
(1977); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-83 (1977).
70. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2087 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). This is the traditional Block-
burger test.
71. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2093 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text. Thus, in Dowling the government would
not have violated the Grady test when it used Ms. Henry's testimony at Dowling's trial for the
bank robbery. The government used the evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the bank
robber. This use of evidence apparently is not the same, under Grady, as using Ms. Henry's
testimony to establish the defendant's identity as the man who invaded her home. See Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
However, Grady held that "a State cannot avoid the dictates of the Double Jeopardy Clause
merely by altering in successive prosecutions the evidence offered to prove the same conduct."
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The State conceded that the conduct it would prove to establish essen-
tial elements of the homicide and assault offenses was the entirety of the
conduct for which Corbin had been previously convicted. 7 5 Applying its
new test to these facts, the majority held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred Corbin's subsequent prosecution.76 The Court did note that its hold-
ing would not bar a subsequent prosecution on the homicide and assault
charges if the State did not rely on proving the conduct for which Corbin
had already been convicted.77
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor espoused her belief that the
new rule articulated by the majority "casts doubt on the continued vitality
of Rule 404(b)." 7 8 According to Justice O'Connor, the majority's ruling
effectively rendered Dowling "a nullity in many circumstances."79 She as-
tutely recognized that if a situation identical to Dowling arose today, "a
conscientious judge attempting to apply the test enunciated by the Court
... would probably conclude that the witness's testimony was barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause."80
Justice Scalia's dissent rejected the majority's requirement "that all
charges arising out of a single occurrence must be joined in a single indict-
ment."8 After presenting a textual and historical analysis, Justice Scalia
observed that "Blockburger furnishes... the 'established test' for determin-
ing whether successive prosecutions arising out of the same events are for
Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2093. For example, if two bystanders had witnessed
Corbin's accident, the State could not call one witness at the first trial and then call the other
witness at the second trial to testify to the same conduct. Id.
75. Grady, 495 U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
76. Id
77. Id Unfortunately, the only other conduct which remained in the bill of particulars was
speeding. Evidence of that conduct alone was insufficient to sustain the convictions for the homi-
cide and assault charges.
78. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Grady may have serious ramifi-
cations in prosecuting "signature crimes" where identity may be the crucial issue.
79. IM. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2095. In dissent, Justice O'Connor stated:
The record in Dowling indicated that the Government was offering the eyewitness testi-
mony to establish the defendant's identity, "an essential element of an offense charged in
[the subsequent] prosecution,"... and that the testimony would likely "prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted" . . . Under the
Court's reasoning, the Government's attempt to introduce the eyewitness testimony would
bar the second prosecution of Dowling for bank robbery. As a practical matter, this means
that the same evidence ruled admissible in Dowling is barred by Grady.
Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Because the Court de-
cided the two cases only four months apart, it is difficult to reconcile their apparent
inconsistencies.
80. Id at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2095.
81. Id. at- , 110 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined in Justice Scalia's dissent.
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the 'same offence [sic].' "82 Accordingly, he would depart from the Block-
burger rule in only two situations. "One occurs where a statutory offense
expressly incorporates another statutory offense without specifying the lat-
ter's elements."83 The other situation occurs in the area of collateral estop-
pel.84 Subject to these two exceptions, Justice Scalia would adhere to the
Blockburger test regardless of the overlap between the proof required for
each prosecution.15
The dissent recognized that in Vitale, the Court did not decide whether
a "second prosecution would constitute double jeopardy if it required proof
of the conduct for which Vitale had already been convicted."W8 6 However,
in answering this question now, Justice Scalia responded with a resounding
no.87 The Grady dissenters wondered if the judge in the second trial bore
the burden of deciding whether the evidence proved the earlier charge, and
if so, by what burden of proof.88 Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that the
Dowling decision precluded the result reached by the majority. According
to Justice Scalia:
The difference in our holding today cannot rationally be explained
by the fact that in Dowling, unlike the present case, the two crimes
were part of separate transactions; that in no way alters the central
vice (according to today's holding) that the defendant was forced a
second time to defend against proof that he had committed a rob-
bery for which he had already been prosecuted. In Dowling, as here,
conduct establishing a previously prosecuted offense was relied
upon, not because that offense was a statutory element of the second
offense, but only because the conduct would prove the existence of a
statutory element. If that did not offend the Double Jeopardy
Clause in Dowling, it should not do so here.89
Foreshadowing a tentative future for the Grady decision, Justice Scalia
stated: "A limitation that is so unsupported in reason and so absurd in
application is unlikely to survive."90
82. Grady, 495 U.S. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2097 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166
(1977)).
83. Grady, 495 U.S. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2097; see Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
84. Grady, 495 U.S. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2097; see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85. Grady, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2097; see lanelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975).
86. Grady, 495 U.S. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2101.
87. Id.
88. Id. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2104.
89. Id. at-, 110 S. Ct. at 2102.




The rule articulated in Grady v. Corbin91 appears on its face to be a
clarification of the Blockburger test. However, it is in fact a perversion of
that rule. Rather than clarify the meaning of the "same offense" language
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, Grady handcuffs prosecutors in their efforts
to achieve justice.
The Blockburger test, as Missouri v. Hunter9 2 recognized, is a rule of
statutory construction. It is a guide to determine whether the legislature
intended multiple punishments.93 Its beauty is in its simplicity. The test
merely requires that a comparison be made of the statutory elements of the
offenses for which the State intends to prosecute. Such a comparison is
done objectively, thus precluding selective prosecution or vindictiveness.
However, Grady added a subjective element to that objective test. The
Grady test requires the trial court to review the evidence proved in the first
trial. The court must then determine whether the prosecutor will seek to
establish an essential element of the second crime by proving conduct for
which the defendant has been previously acquitted or convicted.
A number of problems are almost certain to arise as a result of Grady.
For example, what if the trial court does decide that the prosecutor would
rely on evidence already used to convict the defendant in the first trial? One
can only surmise that this may allow the prosecutor to go back to the draw-
ing board and redesign a new case against the defendant. In the alternative,
Grady may require that the prosecutor dismiss the case against the defend-
ant entirely.
In addition, it is impractical, not to mention unfair, to require the prose-
cutor to reveal all of the evidence he/she intends to use to prosecute the
defendant. It is impractical because such a requirement only serves to fur-
ther bog down the already overcrowded criminal justice system. Likewise,
it is unfair to require the prosecution to give the defense a "sneak preview"
of its case-in-chief.
Furthermore, whether or not the evidence is the same as the evidence at
the first trial requires a subjective evaluation. As a result, courts through-
out the country will apply the test inconsistently. One court may allow the
prosecution to go forward, while another court may rule that Grady bars
the prosecution from proceeding (unless the prosecutor can do so without
the excluded evidence). Grady does not offer any guidelines in applying the
new standard.
91. 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
92. 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
93. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2091 (1990).
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As Justice Scalia's dissent aptly recognizes, Grady leaves a question un-
answered: to what degree must the evidence be proved at the first trial in
order to result in its exclusion in the second trial? Even if we assume the
evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it is impossible to
know whether any one piece of evidence has been proved to this degree. If
the jury in the first trial returned a guilty verdict, we cannot be certain on
what evidence it based its decision. If the jury returned an acquittal, we are
equally uncertain which evidence it believed or disbelieved. Again, Grady
does not resolve this problem.
Grady has been the law for over a year, and recently its impact is be-
coming apparent.94 In United States v. Quinones, the defendant pleaded to
94. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). Certainly, the prosecution of-
fered Ms. Henry's testimony in the first trial to establish the defendant's identity. Id at 345. Yet,
the Dowling Court allowed Ms. Henry's testimony to establish the identity of the defendant at the
second trial. However, the Grady Court would have disallowed this type of evidence.
It is interesting to note that Grady does not cite to United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989). In Halper, the Supreme Court recognized that "jeopardy" can attach when the second
prosecution is for a civil offense. 490 U.S. at 441. Irwin Halper worked as a manager of a com-
pany which provided medical services for patients who received Medicare. Id. at 437. He submit-
ted 65 separate false claims to Medicare for reimbursement for services rendered. Id The
government charged and convicted Halper on 65 counts of violating the criminal false claims
statute, and on 16 counts of mail fraud. Id. The government then brought suit against Halper
under the civil False Claims Act seeking penalties of $2,000 per claim, which aggregated to
$130,000. Id. at 438.
Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court, held that the civil penalties
were so punitive as to constitute a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Justice Blackmun wrote:
[A] defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be sub-
jected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly
be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
Id at 448-49. According to the High Court, the actual labels of "criminal" or "civil" are less
important than the penalties imposed on the defendant. Id at 447.
The Court recognized that it may be difficult to "determine the precise dollar figure at which a
civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose of making the Government whole, but be-
yond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment." Id. at 449. The Court remanded
the case to allow the government an opportunity to demonstrate how its injuries justified the
extreme civil sanctions. Id at 452; see also United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (1 1th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 178 (1990) (the order of the criminal and civil prosecutions is irrele-
vant in applying the Halper principle); United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(the disparity between the civil penalty and the government's injury was too great to trigger
Halper).
Grady has no impact on the Halper principle, which encompassed a purely civil proceeding
following a purely criminal one. Grady did not explicitly address the impact of Halper in the
situation where one prosecution is for quasi-criminal conduct, such as operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. However, one can reasonably infer from the facts and holding in Grady that the
actual labels of "criminal," "civil," and "quasi-criminal" are less significant than the penalties
they carry when evaluating a double jeopardy claim.
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some, but not all, of the charges.9" The court decided that he did so in an
attempt to create a double jeopardy claim. The court held that Grady did
not overrule prior case law which recognized that a defendant may not use
the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword.96 Other courts have also at-
tempted to distinguish Grady. In United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon,97 the court
limited the Grady "same conduct" test to successive prosecutions and held
that Grady does not apply to multiple punishment cases. A number of
states have applied Grady with varying results. To date, the only Wisconsin
case which interprets Grady is State v. Harris.98 In State v. Harris, the de-
fendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle after revocation. The
State subsequently charged him with feloniously operating a motor vehicle
without the owner's consent.99 Both offenses arose from the same incident.
The court accurately recognized that the critical inquiry in Grady is what
conduct the State will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove
that conduct. However, the court's conclusion seems incongruous with the
Grady ruling. The Wisconsin court held:
Grady viewed driving while intoxicated as conduct.... Similarly,
we view driving while revoked as conduct. The fact that one acts
while in a state of intoxication or in a state of revocation does not
alter the analysis. For purposes of evaluating the quality or nature
of an actor's conduct, which is one function of proof at a trial, the
actor's status is an essential component of his behavior and therefore is
not to be ignored or separated. Harris' conduct here was operating
while revoked. That is not the conduct upon which the state relies
to prove the second prosecution. x°°
In sum, the court of appeals found that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
bar the subsequent prosecution. In its analysis, the court did not separate
the essential element of "operating" from the rest of the statutory ele-
95. United States v. Quinones, 906 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 789
(1991).
96. Id at 928.
97. 917 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2035 (1991). A number of courts
have rejected the suggestion that Grady precludes proof of previously prosecuted conduct in a
subsequent RICO prosecution, at least where the RICO offense continues beyond the prior prose-
cution. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1990); accord United States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991); see also United States v. Espo-
sito, 912 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1990), cert dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 806 (1991).
98. State v. Harris, 161 Wis. 2d 758, 469 N.W.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1991). The only other Wis-
consin case which mentions Grady is State v. Myers, 158 Wis. 2d 356, 370 n.9, 461 N.W.2d 777,
783 n.9 (1990). However, Myers neither applies nor interprets Grady, it only refers to Grady as an
authority on double jeopardy.
99. Harris, 161 Wis. 2d at 760, 469 N.W.2d at 208.
100. Id at 764, 469 N.W.2d at 210 (emphasis added).
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ments. "' Had it done so, Grady certainly would have forced the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals to reach a different result. Thus, the court's subjective
delineation of the elements of the crimes charged served to circumvent the
impact of Grady. Perhaps this case will find its way to the United States
Supreme Court and be the one to overrule Grady. Until then, divergent
results continue to prosper among the State courts.
In State v. Magazine, a South Carolina court determined that Grady
barred a subsequent prosecution of the defendant's wife for assault and bat-
tery following the imposition of a contempt sanction for violating a family
court protective order.'0 2 However, in State v. Clarke, the same court held
that Grady did not bar a subsequent prosecution for unlawfully carrying a
pistol following the defendant's acquittal for unlawfully changing lanes, de-
spite the fact that both charges grew out of the same facts.10 3
Hovey v. Superior Court is an Arizona case with facts strikingly similar
to Grady and with just as frustrating a result."'4 In Hovey, the defendant
pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of a fatal accident. 0 5 The state subse-
quently indicted Hovey for manslaughter based on the same incident." 6
The court held that Grady barred the manslaughter charge because the
prosecution would necessarily have to reprove the accident, death, and
recklessness involved in the first offense.' 0 7 The Hovey court appeared to
apply a "same evidence" test rather than the "same conduct" test as man-
dated by Grady. This is another example of the inconsistent application of
a decision "unsupported in reason" and "absurd in application."1 0 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The rule of law mandated by Grady v. Corbin " allows a defendant to
escape prosecution for a crime that does not violate the Blockburger test.
Just as a defendant has the right to enjoy the protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause, so too does society have the right to punish
wrongdoers for their crimes. It is neither fair nor just to allow the Corbins
and the Hoveys of the world to escape punishment for manslaughter by
pleading guilty to a traffic offense.
101. Id.
102. State v. Magazine, 393 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. 1990).
103. State v. Clarke, 396 S.E.2d 827, 828 (S.C. 1990).
104. Hovey v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 416 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
105. Id. at 417.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 419.
108. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2104 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. 495 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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It is apparent that the Grady decision does not accomplish its goal. The
apparent goal of Grady is to allow a defendant the protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The apparent effect, however, is to allow a defendant to
use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a shield. Grady allows the accused to
escape prosecution for crimes which are not the "same offense" under the
Blockburger test. By introducing the subjective element of analyzing the
evidence proved at a prior trial, yet failing to set forth workable guidelines
by which to apply this new test, the Court has invited inconsistent applica-
tion of the law. Historically, the Blockburger test has served as an objective
and practical framework by which to determine whether the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution. Whatever shortcomings the
Blockburger test may have, Grady v. Corbin does not remedy them. If there
is to be a modification of the Blockburger test, the Supreme Court should
try again to find it.
DiANE M. RESCH

